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104In recent years great progress has been made in the
computational modeling of interval timing. A wide range of
models capturing different aspects of interval timing now exist.
These models can be seen as constituting four, sometimes
overlapping, general classes of models: pacemaker–
accumulator models, multiple–oscillator models, memory–
trace models, and drift–diffusion (or random-process) models.
We suggest that computational models should be judged
based on their performance on a number of criteria — namely,
the scalar property, their ability to reproduce retrospective and
prospective timing effects, and their sensitivity to attentional
and neurochemical manipulations. Future challenges will
involve building integrated models and sharing model code to
allow direct comparisons against a battery of empirical data.
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Although there are numerous ways in which computational
models of interval timing can be classified, we have chosen
to group these models into four major, although sometimes
overlapping, classes: firstly, pacemaker–accumulator mod-
els (PA models), secondly, multiple–oscillator-coincidence
detection models (also sometimes called timestamp mod-
els), thirdly, memory or neural process models and, finally,
fourthly random-process (or drift–diffusion) models. For
alternative classification schemes, see, for example [1,2].
In what follows we will suggest that computational mod-
els of interval timing be judged on the basis of the
following criteria: the scalar property, prospective and retro-
spective timing, and the effects of attention and neuropharma-
cological manipulations.
Extensive empirical evidence [3–6] suggests that time-
estimation errors in interval timing grow approximatelyPlease cite this article in press as: Addyman C, et al.: Computational models of interval timing, C
www.sciencedirect.com linearly with the size of the estimate. Known as the scalar
property of time estimation, this fact sets a hard constraint
on the nature of the underlying processes involved in time
estimation [7]. This effect has been widely replicated in
humans, pigeons, and rodents (see [8–10]. Similar behav-
ioral responses to time scales can even be found in rate-
dependent habituation in Caenorhabditis elegans [11]. Even
though the scalar property has not been found to hold
under all conditions [12], modeling it has proved to be a
significant challenge for a number of existing models of
interval-time judgments [7,13]. In a recent paper, Hass
and Hermann [7] use information theoretic arguments to
show how the scalar property places several important
restrictions on the nature of any interval timing mecha-
nism. Crucially, they argue that, in order to display scalar
error profiles, the neural process underlying time percep-
tion must be based on a measure of growing variance in
the system.
Secondly, it has been established that the perceived
passage of time by human adults differs according to
whether they are forewarned that they will need to make
a timing judgment, and are therefore actively attending to
its passage ( prospective time estimation), or whether they
are required to make an unexpected, after-the-fact judg-
ment of the passage of time (retrospective time estimation).
Models should be judged on how well they account for
both of these regimes.
And thirdly, there are various systematic effects on the
lengths of estimates caused by levels of attention [14] and
neurochemistry, such as endogenous levels of dopamine
or the effects of dopaminergic drugs [15–17].
We avoided the criterion of ‘neurobiological plausibility’
because it is notoriously difficult to pin down exactly what
is meant by this expression. So, for example, how realistic
do computational neurons have to be before the model
that uses them can be said to be biologically plausible?
Pacemaker–accumulator models
The pacemaker–accumulator models (PAM) [18,19]
have had a great influence on the way that experiments
on timing are conceived and interpreted. Many of the
recent models of timing still utilize the pacemaker and
accumulator processes described by Treisman [20].
These models currently constitute the most popular
computational approaches to interval timing. In the pace-
maker–accumulator model, the arrival of a stimulus starts
a clock which generates pulses that are counted by an
accumulator. Time judgments are then made by a com-
parison of what is stored in the accumulator and what isurr Opin Behav Sci (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2016.01.004










































































































































No Prospective The first Pacemaker model to
address the Scalar property.




No Prospective An unreliable counter
mechanism can give rise to
scalar property under very
narrow circumstances.
[19,62] Pacemaker–accumulator Pacemaker with
geometrically increasing









Prospective A classical PAM embedded in
an ACT-R framework models
attention effects as a result of
resource competition.
[63] Pacemaker–accumulator Constant rate pacemaker ACT-R model with time




Prospective Simplistic PAM model built in
ACT-R.




No Prospective Notable for allowing direct
quantitative test of SET by




Set of cortical oscillators of
different phase
Time measured by
selecting subset that will
be in phase at correct
interval




Set of cortical oscillators of
different phases
Coincidence detectors











Prospective A modern oscillator model
that takes good account of
neuroscience evidence.
[26,27] Multiple–oscillator: SBF
with realistic noisy neurons
Set of cortical oscillators




















No Prospective First memory decay model
was actually model of




[36] Memory decay: Gaussian
Activation Model (GAMIT)
Spreading cortical
activation from event to be
timed and rate of change of
activation.
Comparison of activation






Both Retrospective case a single
estimate is made at end of
interval. In prospective case
multiple estimates during
interval contribute.



























































































































































































































[35,53] Memory decay: temporal
context model (TCM)
Set of leaky integrators that










No Both Adapts model of serial
memory performance to more





[64] Memory decay: coupled
leaky integrators
Decay in activation in a two
neuron systems acts like a
simple oscillator.
Network has wait or
respond states.
No No Prospective A very simple neural system
model animal learning data.
Noise plays important role in
stabilizing network behavior.
[38] Climbing activation Firing rate adaptation in





Changes to adaptation rate
change interval
Yes No Prospective Detailed neural model inspired
by recordings from macaque
inferotemporal cortex.
[65] Climbing activation: Dual
klepsydra model
Leaky integrator Comparing one integrator
to another
No No Prospective Unclear why integrator values







Networks seemed to work
via climbing activation.
No No Prospective Evolved neural network with
standard leaky-integrator
neurons tells time without
clock-like control a robot in a
simulated environment.
[45] Random process:
population of bistable units
Population of independent
bistable units transitioning
from off to on
When number of ON
neurons crosses threshold
Yes No Prospective Different intervals measured
by different global transition
probabilities. Not clear how
this would be implemented.
[46,47] Random process: drift–
diffusion model of interval







Yes No Prospective An probabilistic model than
accounts for decision making
and interval production in
same framework.
[66] Contextual change Estimates derived from
amount of activity, number
of actions and ACT-R
system time.




but embedding model in ACT-




























































































































































































































Cored in memory. Gibbon’s Scalar Expectancy Theory
ET) model emphasized the importance of reproducing
e property of scale invariance observed in interval
ming [3,18]. Scalar error in this model arises not from
e clock itself but rather from noise in the comparison
rocess. Several variants on this original pacemaker–
ccumulator design have been produced. For example,
illeen and Taylor [21] use a different approach to the
alar property by using a noisy accumulator process
ther than a noisy comparator (Table 1).
ecent models have taken the pacemaker–accumulator
rocess and incorporated it into a larger cognitive system.
or example, Taatgen et al. [19] place a timekeeping
odule in the context of a general ACT-R architecture to
apture the effects of attention and resource competition
n interval timing. This model incorporates an attentional
ate which modulates the rate of pulse accumulation
ence leading to changes in the perception of intervals.
nother example is Komosinski and Kups [22] who build
 classical PAM in a neural simulator environment to
odel time-judgment errors in successively presented
me intervals.
ne difficulty with these models is that errors in sequen-
al processes grow too slowly (as the square root of length
f the interval). Any timer based on direct accumulation
f ticks would be too accurate. In order to account for the
alar property of time, pacemaker–accumulator models
ave to introduce a secondary source of multiplicative
rror in the comparison process [7].
ultiple–oscillator models
ultiple–oscillator models [23,24] refer to models of
terval timing in which intervals are represented as a
t of activities of several oscillators. An early form of the
odel was developed by Miall [23]. In this model, re-
rred to as the beat frequency (BF) model, timing is
arried out by the activation of several oscillators, each of
hich oscillates at its own particular frequency. The
rrival of a stimulus resets the oscillators so that they
egin to fire together. The time elapsed since the arrival
f the stimulus would then depend on the oscillatory
hases of the entire set of oscillators. However the
istribution of firing was not normally distributed, having
 sharp peak at the target time and smaller peaks at the
ajor harmonics of the fundamental interval. In addition,
e width of the peak was not proportional to the length of
e interval. For this reason, and because the model did
ot contain any noise, it was unable to account for the
roperty of scalar invariance.
he Striatal Beat-Frequency (SBF) model tried to ad-
ress these problems [25]. They modified the BF to
duce the scalar property. The SBF model took into
ccount experimental findings that interval timing was
ot exclusively the result of activity in the basal gangliaPlease cite this article in press as: Addyman C, et al.: Computational models of interval timing,
urrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2016, 8:x–x but also of activity in a thalamo-cortico-striatal circuit. In
this model, oscillations are generated by cortical neurons
and timing is indicated by the coincidental activation of
spiny neurons in the striatum of the basal ganglia by the
cortical oscillators. Oscillator speeds and neuronal firing
thresholds were adjusted on a trial by trail basis in order to
reproduce the Gaussian shaped response profiles seen in
timing experiments that use the peak procedure experi-
mental method and thereby produce scalar invariance.
However, these adjustments had to be globally coherent,
otherwise the coincidence-detections mechanisms would
not operate appropriately. This tends to make the SBF
model oversensitive to small amounts of noise.
Improvements to the SBF model have been made by
[26,27]. This model retained the separation of cortical
and striatal roles used in the SBF models. The neurons in
the new models however, were far more realistic. The
simpler neuronal models were replaced by more detailed
Morris–Lecar neurons and neural activity was now the
result of the dynamics in several ionic channels. This
model succeeded in replicating several experimental
findings on the effects of dopamine and cholinergic
agents on timekeeping. In a more generalized version
of the model in which a perceptron replaced the striatum
and its coincidence detection, scalar errors were an emer-
gent property of the network without the need for global
coherence [26]. The SBF model has also been extended
to include a unified account of duration-based and beat-
based timing mechanisms [28,29].
Memory-based models
A third class of models relies on memory decay and falling
(or rising) neural activation. These neural processes are
relatively well understood and provide evidence that
timing and memory use the same cognitive resources
[30], recruiting neurons in the dorso-lateral prefrontal
cortex [31–33]. Once again, the scalar property does
not always arise from these models in a straightforward
manner. For example, the Multiple Time Scales model
(MTS, [11,34]) relies on a series of leaky integrators with
power law decay and these integrators must be carefully
linked to approximate the required logarithmic decay
function. The Temporal Context Model (TCM, [35])
relies on many leaky integrators and far more complex
dynamics than the MTS model.
Computational memory models have been introduced
which take into account not only the amount of activation
decay of a memory trace but also the rate at which
activation decays (GAMIT: [36,37]). In this model,
there is a mechanism of attentional-resource sharing that
allows GAMIT to model both retrospective and prospec-
tive timing.
By contrast with these falling activation-trace models,
Reutimann et al. [38] use a single climbing neuronal trace Curr Opin Behav Sci (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2016.01.004
www.sciencedirect.com

















































































































328that attains a threshold at the expected end of an
interval. This model [38] is built on a single mechanism
using well-understood principles of synaptic plasticity
and the decision rule is built into the model itself.
Single cell recordings in the inferotemporal cortex of
monkeys have, in fact, found neurons with the appro-
priate time-dependent firing rates [39,40]. This inter-
pretation of climbing activation remains controversial,
however, see [41].
An interesting recent addition to this class is [42,43], in
which neural networks with standard leaky-integrator neu-
rons were evolved to control a robot in a simulated envi-
ronment in order to perform a temporal comparison task.
When network activity was examined timing appeared
to be due to a climbing activation mechanism.
Random process models
Models discussed so far have been broadly deterministic
or based on probabilistic processes (e.g. counting random
ticks) that produce time estimates that have less than
scalar error. The models in this section are based on
probabilistic processes with linear or greater than linear
error. The simplest approach [44] replaces a single Pois-
son process with a group of 100 independent Poisson
process and a leaky integrate-and-fire neuron that fires
and resets every time it crosses a threshold. With a fixed
threshold this model underestimates intervals but
improves with the incorporation of a dynamic threshold
that is inhibited by recent firings. However, the actual fit
to empirical data remains poor. A better fit to data is
obtained by [45] in which a timer starts by setting 50 bis-
table units to ‘off’. Thereafter, each bistable unit transi-
tions to ‘on’ independently with probability p (adjusted
by learning) and the timer stops when a total of 40 units
are active.
If excitatory and inhibitory processes both contribute to
the same integrator then, unless the processes are pre-
cisely balanced, the resulting random walk will drift in
one direction. Adjusting the balance adjusts the rate of
drift allowing different intervals to be learned [46,47].
The learning process is simpler than in [45] because it
does not rely on fine tuning a group of probabilities. The
approach has additional advantages that the same frame-
work can model decision making and that it makes
several quite precise predictions about skew and coeffi-
cients of variation of responses in temporal reproduction
tasks.
Finally, it should be noted that in subsecond timing
most successful models are random-process models,
based on stochastically connected chains of noisy neurons
[48,49,50]. However, most authors do not think that these
models can be extended to the multi-second domain
of interval timing [51]. This inability to scale up to
multi-second timing applies only to these random-processPlease cite this article in press as: Addyman C, et al.: Computational models of interval timing, C
www.sciencedirect.com models. It remains an open question as to whether other
classes of models can account for both subsecond and
multi-second timing.
Difficulties with the models
As currently implemented pacemaker–accumulator and
multiple–oscillator models rely on a dedicated timing
mechanism which needs to be started when a particular
event occurs. This is problematic for retrospective timing
because all perceived events are potential candidates for
retrospective time judgments and, therefore, each event
would require a separate timer.
Staddon [52] suggested that memory–trace models could
overcome this reset problem because all perceived events
encoded by the cognitive system automatically result in
representations that are governed by the same trace
dynamics. However, most activation-trace models posit
a specialist timing mechanism that is only recruited when
timing is required (e.g. [34,38]) and models of this type
can only address prospective timing. The Temporal
Context Model (TCM) [35] developed from a model
of episodic memory, can potentially perform both retro-
spective and prospective timing. To the best of our
knowledge, TCM is the first attempt to use features of
memory directly as a mechanism for interval timing.
GAMIT [36] has similar motivations but is much sim-
pler than TCM.
Our estimates of time passing can also be affected by
whether or not we are actively attending to the passage of
time and by cognitive load. Block et al. [14] found that
high cognitive load increases retrospective time estimates
and decreases prospective time estimates. Modeling this
surprising effect is a challenge for all existing models of
interval timing. French et al. [36] suggest an attentional
resource-sharing mechanism that allows prospective and
retrospective timing to be accounted for in a single
model. Moreover, this model, GAMIT [36], is currently
the only computational model to account for this inter-
action.
Most models simply do not consider attentional effects on
interval time perception [34,38,53]. One simple proposal
is that attention might modulate clock speed directly
[25]. If decreased attention to timing causes the organ-
ism’s internal clock to beat slower, then it will tend to
underestimate the length of intervals. This idea is devel-
oped further in the time-sharing model [54]. Working
memory, timing and attention all depend on dopaminer-
gic pathways [32,55,56]. The changes observed in interval
timing estimates following pharmacological interventions
that modulate clock speed [16,57] have been modeled by
letting dopamine levels affect oscillator frequency (e.g.
[26,27,58]). Nevertheless, none of these models can
account for the increase in retrospective estimates under
high cognitive load.urr Opin Behav Sci (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2016.01.004















































































































































































Car fewer models attempt to explain retrospective timing,
 part because retrospective timing does not have an
quivalent in animal behavior. A common theme behind
ll approaches to retrospective timing is that intervals are
stimated by reconstructing a sequence of remembered
vents. Cognitive load could affect this by changing the
emorability or numerosity of events [59,60].
uture challenges
 conclusion, computational models of interval timing
ave come a long way but are still faced with many
hallenges. Besides the difficulties already discussed, a
enuinely mature model needs to:
 fit individual not just group data
 give a coherent account of relationship between
retrospective and prospective timing,
 apply to the full range of timing tasks and their
associated attentional and pharmacological modula-
tions,
 explain commonalities and differences between animal
and human time perception.
e have argued elsewhere [61] that modelers need to
ake their code available and user accessible so that their
odels can be directly compared and developed. The
urrent variety of modeling approaches is a strength.
ringing the successes of these varied models into a
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